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WATER INSECURITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE AS EMERGING

HUMAN MIGRATION PRESSURES
Michael Tiboris
I.

Introduction'

Water insecurity is the inability of a population to reliably gather adequate
water of acceptable quality to simultaneously meet its needs for health, wellbeing, and basic economic development. 2 Reflecting on this definition one is
struck by how much has to go right in order for a population to be water secure.
Even under circumstances of relative abundance, water must be managed wellproperly treated and transported-with economic uses balanced against ecological consequences and shared sources governed by law and policy. The immediacy of the emergency caused by a sudden drop in availability or quality is
unusually destabilizing. 3 This underscores the extent to which water insecurity,
and its consequences, are fundamentally mediated by human institutions and policies. Scarcity, even if quite deep, does not automatically result in lower quality
it makes careful governance and thoughthealth, well-being, or development, but
4
important.
more
the
all
planning
ful
Climate change raises the stakes and creates new crises. Since the publication
of the International Panel on Climate Change's First Assessment Report in 1990,
an enormous volume of scientific research on the effects of climate change has
painted an increasingly dire picture. 5 Carbon emissions have not slowed sufficiently in the interim and halting international political efforts to reverse carbon
emissions allow us to predict a near-term future that is both profoundly changed
for the negative and almost unavoidable. 6 Passing the established threshold of a
1.5'C global average temperature increase above pre-industrial levels, which we
are likely to do, will put hundreds of millions of people at risk of food insecurity,
I Thanks to Michelle David for research assistance and editing.
2 E.g., U.N. Water, Water Security and the Global Water Agenda (Mar. 22, 2013), https://collec
Brahma Chellaney,
tions.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:2651/Water-Security-and-the-Global-Water-Agenda.pdf,
WATER, PEACE, AND WAR: CONFRONTING THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS 26 (2015); Colin H. Kahl, STATES,
SCARCITY, AND CIVIL STRIFE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 11 (2008); Colleen Devlin & Cullen S. Hendrix, Trends and Triggers Redux: Climate Change, Rainfall, and Interstate Conflict, 43 POL. GEOGRAPHY
27, 28-30 (2014).
3 Scott Moore, SUBNATIONAL HYDROPOL1TICS: CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND INSTITUTION-BuILD8 (2018); Joshua Busby, WATER AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 6 (2017),

ING IN SHARED RIVER BASINS

https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/defaultfiles/pdf/2017/01[Discussion-Paper-BusbyWater andUSSe
curityOR.pdf.
4 Moore, supra note 3, at 8; Busby, supra note 3, at 6.
5 IPCC Working Group I, Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment, at 7-8 (1990), https://
www.ipcc.ch/publications and-data/publications-ipcc-first assessment-_1 990_wg 1.shtml.
6 The IPCC's most current special report collects impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above preindustrial levels related to greenhouse gas emissions. IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5°C, at 8, Doc. SR1.5
(Oct. 6, 2018), http://report.ipcc.ch/srl5/pdf/srl5-spmfinal.pdf.
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water stress, and poverty. 7 Water insecurity is already quite common in the developing world. About 1.2 billion people live with physical water scarcity, where
water consumption is greater than seventy-five percent of renewable supply.
Even when water is available, a population may not have the technical or financial means to access it. An additional 1.6 billion people live with this sort of
"economic scarcity." 8 Water insecurity clusters in low-and-middle-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central and South Asia and, within those populations, is most severe for the poor, rural populations, and women. 9 This is set to
become considerably worse in the coming decades because the communities
most affected by scarcity are also the least prepared to adapt to and recover from
climate change. 10 This is by no means, however, a problem limited to the global
poor. Cape Town, South Africa's recent water crisis demonstrates the extent to
which climate change is likely to make water security a challenge even
for wealthier places, historically thought to be paradigms of aggressive
climate preparedness. 1 ' We do not have to wait for some distant future to see
the effects of climate on water resources, but we should expect them to intensify significantly in the coming decades.' 2 One likely consequence of this will
be increased human migration away from chronic water insecurity. 1 3 Again,
this is not just a future problem. Migration patterns toward cities in Bangladesh, for instance, display a retreat from salinized soil caused by flooding, seawater intrusion, and poor irrigation practice. 14 Other environmental migration
7 Id. at 8-12.
8 Peter H. Gleick et al.,
2 (2014).

THu WORL D'S WATER: THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRE.SHWATER RESOURCES

9 Id. at 3.
10 Z. W. Kundzewicz et al., The Implications of Projected Climate Changefor FreshwaterResources
and Their Management, 53 HYDROLOGICAL SCIENCES J. 3, 3- 10 (2008) (stressing the need for research to
better understand "how climate change might affect freshwater and to assist water managers who need to
adapt to climate change.").
I I Brett Walton, Cape Town's Harrowing Journey to the Brink of Water Catastrophe,CIRCLE OF
BLUE (July 12, 2018), https://www.circleofblue.org/2018/world/cape-towns-harrowing-journey-to-thebrink-of-water-catastrophe/.
12 Blanca E. Jimrnez Cisneros & Taikan Oki, et al., Freshwater Resources, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABI.ITY 234-36 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/wg2/WGIIAR5-Chap3 FINAL.pdf.
13 Richard Black et al., The effect of environmental change on human migration, GLOB. ENVTL.
CHANGE S3, S8 (2011); M. MnE-rTo -,T
AL., MIGRATION AND ITS INTERDEPENDENCIES WITH WATER
SCARCITY, GENDER AND YOUTH EMPLOYMENT (2017); Rafael Reuveny, Climate Change-InducedMigration and Violent Conflict, 26 Poi. GEOGRAPHY 656, 658, 662 (2007); Julia Toscano, Climate Change
Displacement and Forced Migration: An International Crisis, 6 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & Poi 'y 457, 462
(2015); Koko Warner et al., Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Migration, 55 NAT.
HAZARDS 689, 694 (2010); JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE AGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 333 (2015).
14 Ram Mukul Fishman et al., Over-Extractionfrom Shallow Bedrock Versus Deep Alluvial Aquifers:
Reliability Versus Sustainability Considerationsfor India's Groundwater Irrigation, 47 WATER RESOURCES REs. 1, 3 (2011), https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1029/2011WRO10617;
Richard Marshall and Shibaab Rahman, INTERNAL MIGRATION IN BANGLADESH: CHARACTER, DRIVERS
AND POLICY ISSUES 6, 25 (UNDP 2013), http://www.bd.undp.org/content/dam/bangladesh/docs/Publica
tions/Pub-2013/lnternal%20Migration%20in%20Bangladesh%20UNDP%2OFinal.pdf;
see Michael GilIan, Refugees or Infiltrators? The Bharatiya JanataParty and "Illegal" Migrationfrom Bangladesh, 26
ASIAN STUD. REV. 73, 75-76 (2002).
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hotspots include Central and East Africa, Central Asia, rural China, and the
15
Caribbean.
Human migration is becoming a major logistical and political challenge which
we can expect to get progressively worse with the destabilizing effects of climate
change. 16 People move for many reasons, of course, some of them quite positive.
Water and climate are only two of a complex set of reasons for migration and are
both complex motivators in their own right. But water is potentially special in
this context-the need for it is constant and urgent, its management is exceptionally complex, and it is directly affected by climate change.
This article begins with what we know about the relationship between water
insecurity and the population vulnerable to human migration as a result of water
in security. This is followed by a brief description of the relevant international
legal instruments relevant to water-related migration. It then discusses the interaction between emerging conceptions of water rights, the authority of states to
restrict migration, and the degree to which responsibility to protect water migrants can be globalized. I will argue that we cannot adequately distinguish between migration resulting from physical scarcity and failures of governance and
that this ought to have consequences for our views about state obligations to
accommodate migration. The article concludes with some suggestions about legal
and policy instruments that would help us better respond to the expected increase
in water migration.
II.

Background

a.

Water Insecurity as a Cause of Human Migration

The causes of human migration in any particular case are irreducibly complex
and context-dependent. 17 As a result, a cottage research industry has popped up
to argue that, because individual factors like "water scarcity" are rarely unambiguously identified as causal factors, climate migration does not describe a real
or emerging challenge.' 8 It does not follow from complexity, however, that climate change or its water security consequences are not causally significant ele15 Alex de Sherbinin, Climate Change Hotspots Mapping: What Have We Learned?, 123 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 23, 28 (2014); see Warner et al., supra note 13, at 692, 702.
16 See generally Mostafa Mahmud Naser, Climate Change, Environmental Degradation,and Migration: A Complex Nexus, 36 WM. & MARY ENv'r. L. & POL'Y REv. 713, 721, 732-33 (2011) (In this
article, I will use the terms "migration" and "displacement," interchangeably. The word, "Refugee," will
be reserved for describing the legal status of a person who is entitled to special status or protections on
account of being displaced or migrating.).
17 Black et al., supra note 13 (provide a comprehensive conceptual framework for thinking about the
causes of environmental migration. It demonstrates the degree to which the concept of "environmental
migration" is both a unique phenomenon and one of a variety of familiar migratory pressures.).
18 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION [IOM], MIGRATION, THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ASSESSING 'n-rE EVIDENCE 14 (Frank Laczko and Christine Aghazarm eds. 2010), https://
publications.iom.intlsystem/files/pdf/migration-and-environment.pdf; Betsy Hartmann, Rethinking Climate refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and the Politics Of Policy Discourse, 22 J. INT.
DEV. STUDIES ASSOCIATION 233-246 (2010); Olivia V. Dun & Franqois Gemenne, Defining 'Environmental Migration', 31 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 10, 10 (2008); see James Morrissey, Rural-UrbanMigration in Ethiopia, 31 FORCED MIGRATION REv. 28, 28-29 (2008).
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ments of migration. The inability to isolate particular elements of water
insecurity as direct and close to singular causes of migration does not show that it
is not a real causal factor in migration, only that it is part of a complex story that
includes both environmental and socio-economic and political pressures. That
water insecurity is causally related to migration is relevant primarily as a premise
in a larger argument about how we can appropriately respond to migration and its
consequences. What we need to know about the relationship between water, climate, and migration is framed from the start by the policy discussion that follows
it. Water migrants are moving both because they have an immediate need that
they cannot fill through no or little individual fault because it either arises from
natural scarcity or the collective contributions of humans to climate change. Nevertheless, their movement creates serious stresses on the communities they are
leaving, passing through, and entering. What we want to know is how to resolve
migrants' reasonable demand for better conditions and reasonable demands by
others that their own conditions not be unfairly destabilized. Thus, we ought to
be looking for links between water insecurity and migration which elucidate the
basis for these demands and the way that they interact with the social forces that
make movement and conflict attractive. This cannot be done by simply comparing levels of water access and the number of people who report moving. The
value of any causal link between water insecurity and migration must be evaluated on the basis of whether it helps us better understand and respond to
problems like this. 19
There are a host of issues that deserve careful discussion at the intersection of
climate migration and international law. Here I will focus on a narrower issue:
what does water insecurity-related climate migration imply for border regimes
across which migrants must pass? 20 If it is likely that water insecurity will lead to
more displacement and human migration, an increasing number of people will
have to cross borders to find more suitable places to live. Even without the additional inputs of climate change and water scarcity, migration pits the normative
commitments of states to protect their citizens' entitlements to a share of domestic resources from non-citizens against the dire humanitarian needs of people
who are perhaps badly off through no fault or choice of their own. There are
several complicating issues, within this familiar problem of patriotic partiality,
related specifically to climate change because the populations that are the main
19 Wendy Jepson et al., Advancing Human Capabilitiesfor Water Security: A Relational Approach, I
WATER SECURrrY 46, 50 (2017).
20 By "climate migration" I mean the forced or voluntary movement of people resulting from the
direct or indirect effects of climate-related environmental changes. This includes movement in response
to things like storms and droughts, but does not include movement in response to, for example, industrial
environmental degradation. This is a necessarily hazy distinction and particular cases are almost always
up for debate in their relation to climate change because they result from discrete weather or scarcity
events which precipitate movement, and not the general phenomenon of "climate change." By "border
regime" I mean the collection of legal, political, and social mechanisms that establish and regulate the
spatial borders between groups. Most commonly this refers to the actual national borders of a state which
separate citizens of different countries. But it can also refer to sub-national institutional or even ethnic
barriers that in some way constrain the free movement of people and define their life options. This is,
again, a fuzzy concept, but it is important that it be able to capture the idea that a large amount of conflict
over water resources happens at the sub-state level. MOORE, supra note 3 at 9, 62.
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contributors to climate change are not necessarily the ones that must deal with its
migration consequences most directly. Water insecurity, in particular, is complicating because the naturally uneven distribution of water on the planet can mean
that scarcity is not any particular groups' fault. The very feature of water insecurity that makes it so compelling as a humanitarian case also makes it unclear
who, from the perspective of international law, is responsible for ensuring greater
water access.
What is clear, however, is that water insecurity is increasing globally. While
significant progress has been made in drinking water access over the last fifteen
years, the absolute numbers of people with poor water access are still very high.
An estimated 663 million people have no access to drinking water sources within
thirty minutes of their home. 2 1 Even if water sources are closer, they are often
unsafe. An estimated two billion people drink from sources contaminated with
human waste. 2 2 Waterborne disease affects more than 1.5 billion people every
year, and its most common symptom, diarrhea, kills 1.2 million children
annually.23
One of the obstacles to improving global water access is that demand for water
has continued to rise at levels far exceeding the rate of population increase. This
reflects not only population increases but the fact that humans are consuming
24
more water per capita than they have historically. Urban populations consume
more water per capita both because their infrastructure tends to be more water
intensive and because emerging middle-class wealth generates demand for per2 5
sonal goods and a diets which require more water to produce. The high rates of
urbanization and population growth across the developing world suggest a future
of greater inter-sectoral competition for a decreasing stock of renewable water
resources. These trends have already begun to strain global water resources. Over
the last fifty years alone, global per capita freshwater availability has decreased
of water consumption that
by thirty-seven percent. 26 Many countries report rates
27
replenishment.
natural
for
capacity
far exceed their
21 UNICEF & WHO, Progress on Drinking Water, Sanitation and Hygiene: 2017 Update and SDG
Baselines, at 3 (2017), https://www.unicef.orglpublications/index96611.html.
22 Drinking-Water, WHO (Feb. 7, 2018), http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/drinkingwater.
23 UNICEF, supra note 21; UNICEF & WHO, Diarrhoea: Why Children Are Still Dying and What
Can Be Done, at 13, 20 (2009), http://www.who.int/matemal-childadolescent/documents/
9789241598415/en/.
24 WBG, TURBULENT WATERS: PURSUING WATER SECURITY IN FRAGILE CONTEXTS 28 (2017), http://

documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/885171489432062054/Turbulent-waters-pursuing-water-securityin-fragile-contexts; Johan RockstrOm et al., Future Water Availability for Global Food Production: The
Potentialof Green Water for IncreasingResilience to Global Change, 45 WATER RFs. 1, 5 (2009) https://
agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10. 1029/2007WR006767.
25 Willa Paterson et al., Water Footprint of Cities: A Review and Suggestionsfor Future Research, 7
SUSTAINABiriY 8461, 8470 (2015).
26 Jennyfer Wolf et al., An Exploration of Multilevel Modeling for Estimating Access to DrinkingWater and Sanitation, II J. WATER & HFALTH 64, 64-77 (2013).
27 Study: Third of Big Groundwater Basins in Distress, NASA (June 16, 2015), http://www.jpl.
nasa.gov/news/news.php?feature=4626.
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The UN expects 1.8 billion people will live in regions facing critical water
scarcity by 2025.28 Longer term predictions are hard to verify because the effects
of climate change are uncertain. But even without absolute certainty, it is well
within reason to expect higher sea levels, more intense and frequent major
storms, and more seasonable precipitation. 29 All three of these are likely to displace people in urban places in particular. The UN estimates that forty-four percent of the world's population lives within 150 kilometers of the coast and is
likely to be affected by flooding and storms. 30 Coastal populations are growing
rapidly in both Africa and China. Cities, and for that matter agriculture and heavy
water infrastructure, are built where they are to exploit consistent water resources. The central threat of climate change in this context is that we are likely
to see these water sources move away from the places we have invested in building. Over the long term, either water must be moved back to these locations or
the populations themselves must move.
Climate migration is not a new phenomenon, but the intensity of research over
the last thirty years has revealed a growing amount of displacement and voluntary movement related to environmental changes. 3 1 The Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reports that between 2008 and 106, 227.6 million
people were forced to move because of sudden natural disasters. 32 Slower
changes with a longer timescale also appear related to migration rates and spikes
in violence. 33 While there are wide differences in exact predictions depending on
definitions of migration and climate change impacts, there is little question that
millions of people will move, especially in Africa and Asia, in response to environmental changes over the next century. 34 The empirical research on the exact

28 U.N. Water, Managing Water under Uncertaintyand Risk, WWDR4, at 196 (2012), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002156/215644e.pdf; see generally FOA, Coping with Water Scarcity: An
Action Framework for Agriculture and Food Security (2017), http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3015e/
i3015e.pdf (acknowledging the significant problem of water scarcity and providing a conceptual framework to address food and water security).
29 Kundzewicz et al., supra note 10, at 5.
30 Human Settlements on the Coast, UN ArLAS OF" THE OCEANS, http://www.oceansatlas.org/subtopic/en/c/114/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
31 E.g., 31 FORCED MrnGATION REVIEW (Marion Couldrey & Maurice Herson eds. Oct. 2008), https:/
/reliefweb.int/report/world/forced-migration-review-no-31-climate-change-and-displacement
(collecting
articles regarding climate change and displacement); Warner et al., supra note 13; Toscano, supra note
13; ETIFNNE PIGUET, NEw IssuEs IN REFUGEE RFSEARCH: CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORCED MIGRATION,
RESEARCH PAPER No. 153 (UNHCR Jan. 2008); Naser, supra note 16; Norman Myers, Environmental
Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century, 357 PHIL. TRANS. OF THE ROYAL Soc. 609,
609-613 (2002).
32 INTERNATIONAL MONITORING DISPLACEMENT CENTRE, GLOBAL REPORT ON INTERNAL DISPLACE-

(May 2018), http://www.intemal-displacement.org/global-report/grid20l8/downloads/2018GRID.pdf.
33 See generally Alex Evans, Resource Scarcity, Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict,
World Development Report Background Paper (2011) (assessing how natural resource scarcity and
global climate change may alter the risk of violent conflict in the future); compare Ragnhild Nordts &
Nils Petter Gleditsch, Climate Change and Conflict, 26 POL. GEOGRAPHY 627, 635 (2007) (asserting,
"While it is possible that climate change may lead to more conflict in the future, it has not so far caused a
reversal of the current trend towards a more peaceful world.").
34 Frank Biermarm & Ingrid Boas, Protecting Climate Refugees: The Casefor a Global Protocol,50
ENV'T: SCIENCE & POL'Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 8, 10 (2011), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/
MENT
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numbers of expected migrants is controversial and shows wide variations both
because it is a prediction based on an uncertain future and because the methodology of studies is inconsistent. 35 It is a mistake, however, to take this as a reason
to ignore the phenomenon. The range of predictions, while wide, has about
estimates. 36
twenty-five million people displaced on even the most conservative
Even if the number of people who will actually move are on the low end of
predictions, there are strong policy and legal reasons for anticipating this will be
a continuing problem which deserves thoughtful planning to avoid the worst outcomes. It is also a mistake to think of displacement as a future eventuality when
of millions of people who are reasonably classified as
there are currently tens 37
environmental migrants.
b.

Population Vulnerability

Under what conditions does water insecurity cause people to move? The large
number of attempts to describe the causes and conditions of environmental migration yield a few common categories for assessing the causes of displacement. 38 These are significant for the law and moral justifications for intervention
because they pick out different relationships between peoples' decisions to move,
the nature of the environmental conditions, and the scope of their consequences.
Roughly, these categories include people who are:
i. Displaced by rising sea levels
ii. Displaced by sudden-onset disasters including hurricanes, flooding,
heat, and drought
iii. Displaced by progressive degradation in water quantity or quality essential for meeting basic needs
iv. Displaced by a sudden or progressive increase in the number of people
arriving as a result of migration from elsewhere, which results in new
water stress in the host community
(i) and (ii) are distinguished by their timescale and the permanency of relocation. (iii) is distinguished from (ii) by timescale and permanency. In the case of
saltwater intrusion, (iii) might be caused by (i), but it emphasizes displacement
related to quality and availability rather physical displacement by rising water.
(iv) is distinguished from the rest by the fact that it is caused by migration from
10.3200/ENVT.50.6.8-17#aHROcHM6Ly93d3cudGFuZGZvbmxpbmUuY29tL2RvaS9wZGYvMTAuMz
IwMC9FTIZULjUwLjYuOCOxNz9uZWVkQWNjZXNzPXRydWVAQEAw.
35 Id.; Black et al., supra note 13; Naser, supra note 16.
36 Dana Zartner Falstrom, Stemming the flow of environmental displacement: creating a convention
to protect persons and preserve the environment, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENV'T. L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (2002).
37 Id.
38 E.g., Naser, supra note 16; Myers, supra note 31; Pictuvr, supra note 31; Warner et al., supra note
13; Reuveny, supra note 13; FABRICE G. RENAUD ErI AL., CONTROL, ADAPT OR FLEE: HOW To FACE
ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION? No. 5/2001 (2007); U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
(Sept. 2009), http://
Affairs et al., Monitoring DisasterDisplacement In The Context Of Climate 0Change
0 9 m
90 - onitoring-disasterwww.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/2
displacement-thematic-en.pdf.
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somewhere else. It is also the least common but expected to become more common over time as global conditions deteriorate. 39 There is no question that the
distinctions between these are less-than-firm, but they are worth separating, at
least intellectually because each requires different tactics for resiliency and
recovery.
Migration is, for many, an adaptation strategy. Given the conditions that water
migrants are leaving, it holds the potential to improve the quality of their life.
This depends, however, on finding sustainable and stable conditions into which
to move. A large enough influx of migrants to a water secure area can run the
risk of turning it into a water insecure one. The Syrian civil war has been cited
extensively as a case in which poor water policy contributed to conflict and internal migration by heavily subsidizing water extraction on the eve of a profound
drought, leading to agricultural collapse. 40 Internal population and dissatisfaction
with the government precipitated conflict, and the following civil war produced
massive external migration into Jordan, Syria's southern neighbor. Jordan has its
own serious water access issues. It is one of the driest countries in the world,
with per capita water availability of about 125 L/day, which is already below the
global average of 200-300 L/person/day. 4 1 The Zaatari refugee camp contained
more than 80,000 registered refugees in northern Jordan, becoming one of the
country's largest cities. While the National Water Strategy, produced before this
wave of refugees arrived, planned for greater water security in Jordan by 2022, it
was based on a population projection that was exceeded rapidly once refugees
began arriving. This sort of case in which migration-whatever its cause-contributes to water insecurity in the host community is likely to be repeated in the
many places globally where scarcity is geographically broader than any one political border. Water insecurity is, in sum, both cause and effect of migration. 42
The linear story about scarcity, environmental degradation, migration, and
conflict is certainly attractive and compelling. The problem is that it is almost
certainly too simplistic to be correct. Scarcity, even deep and chronic scarcity, is
39 Reuveny, supra note 13.
40 Peter H. Gleick, Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria, 6 WEATHER, CLIMATE, &
SOCIETY 331, 331-340 (2014); Francesca De Chdtel, The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the
Syrian Uprising: Untangling the Triggers of the Revolution, 50 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 521, 521-535

(2014); Colin P. Kelley et al., Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent
Syrian drought, 112 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 3241, 3241 (2015); Marcus
DuBois King, The weaponization of water in Syria and Iraq, 38 THE WASHINGTON QUARIERLY 153,

153-169 (2015); John Wendle, Syria's Climate Refugees., 314 ScnEwFIc AMEICAN 50, 50 (2016);
Kitty van der Heijden, et al., Beyond Conflict, Water Stress Contributedto Europe's Migration Crisis,
WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.wri.org/blog/2015/1 1/beyond-conflict-waterstress-contributed-europe-s-migration-crisis (last visited Sep 27, 2018); Michael Tiboris, Jordan's Water
Woes, Are a Wellspring of Mideast Strife, THE NATIONAL INTEREST (Dec. 11, 2015), https://national

interest.org/feature/jordans-water-woes-are-wellspring-mideast-strife- 14579.
41 Kevin Watkins et al., HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, (UNDP 2006), http://hdr.undp.org/

sites/default/files/reports/267/hdr06-complete.pdf; Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation, Jordan
Water Sector Facts and Figures, USAID, https://jordankmportal.com/resources/ordan-water-sectorfacts-and-figures-1 (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
42 Tobias Hagmann, Confronting the Concept of Environmentally Induced Conflict, 6 PEACE, CONFLIcT & DEV. 1, 1-22 (2005); PIGULET, supra note 31; Ashok Swain, Environmental Migrationand Conflict Dynamics: Focus on Developing Regions, 17 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 959, 959-974 (1996).
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not by itself a predictor of water conflict or water migration. 43 The direct connection between low water access and migration is not a good model for thinking

about water migration. 4 This significantly complicates the account given above.
Contemporary research on this topic has begun to shift, rightly, toward more
complex models of environmental displacement as well as an emphasis on case
studies, rather than global assessments, which incorrectly suggest an easy-to-understand uniformity in environmental migration. 45 The particular problem this
46
research identifies is that environmental change is treated as an acute "hazard."
The sense that this is inadequate is already present in the effort to distinguish
hazards that have shorter and longer timescales, but this seems to miss the point
that migration is inextricably a social phenomenon and rarely has the linear character of hazard to expulsion. 4 7 To take the more complex analytical approach
suggests that environmental change is a contributing element of migration decisions that cannot reasonably be separated from other sorts of migration decisions.
Developing models for treating water migration as a distinct sort of hazard that
increases vulnerability for migration independently of social, economic, and political conditions is attractive only as a simplified media narrative. Alternative
models are empirically messy but improve our ability to identify vulnerable
populations and, as I will argue below, influence the way in which water migration should be understood by legal frameworks.
Rejecting a linear, hazard-based account of water migration does not mean
that we cannot identify any meaningful and useful patterns in water insecurity
and human migration. Instead, it means that these pathways must be treated as
mechanisms which are inconsistently and variably present but nevertheless significant for understanding people's decisions to migrate and how we ought, legally, practically, and politically, to respond to them. This provides a "toolbox"
for understanding water migration rather than universal constants in their causation. Black et al., identify five rough drivers of migration which are useful for
framing these mechanisms-economic, political, demographic, social, and environmental. 48 Poverty is the main concern when it comes to water access and
exposure to disasters. The global poor have the highest rates of water insecurity
and overwhelmingly bear the brunt of the destabilizing consequences of poor
Moore, supra note 3; Aaron T. Wolf, Conflict and CooperationAlong International Waterways, 1
WATER PoL'Y 251, 251-265 (1998).
43

44 Black et al., supra note 13.
45 See generally Warner et al., supra note 13; Sabine L. Perch-Nielsen et al., Exploring the Link

Between Climate Change and Migration, 91 CLrMATIC CHANGE 375, 375 (2008); Black et al., supra note
13; Edward R. Carr, Placing the Environment in Migration: Environment, Economy, and Power in
Ghana's Central Region, 37 ENV'T & PLANNING A 925, 925-946 (2005). See also Sarfaraz Alam, Environmentally Induced Migration from Bangladesh to India, 27 STRATEGIC ANALYsIS 422, 422-438
(2003); Alisson Flavio Barbieri & Ulisses EC Confalonieri, Climate Change, Migration And Health:
Exploring Potential Scenarios of Population Vulnerability in Brazil, MIGRATION & CLIMATE CHANGE 49,
49-73 (2011); Sabine Henry et al., Modelling Inter-ProvincialMigration in Burkina Faso, West Africa:
The Role Of Socio-Demographic and Environmental Factors, 23 APPLIED GEOGRAPHY 115, 115-136
(2003).
46 Black et al., supra note 13, at 84.
47
48

Id.; Jepson et al., supra note 19.
Black et al., supra note 13, at $6-S7.
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water access. 49 Government policy has direct effects on water security as well.
Decisions to privilege polluting industries, or unsustainable patterns of agricultural water usage, have a direct impact on social stability and migration. 50 Population movement and competition between groups over declining water supplies
are essentially political problems where management of shared resource is inadequate. "Social drivers" describe patterns of migration created by social connections between places, which make them attractive pathways for any sort of
migration. An example of this is historical migration to the United States in
which immigrants formed ethnic neighborhood communities in American cities,
attracting increasing numbers of immigrants from that particular ethnic group.
But it also includes economic pathways of remittances, which can make physical
migration more or less likely in the place receiving them. 51 Finally, environmental drivers are the physical ecosystem conditions which include at least items (1)
- (3) in the "hazard" analysis. The dramatically increased complexity of this
framework allows us to avoid some problems for understanding water migration,
but it creates others.
For example, it helps explain why we should not expect to see migration as a
necessary upshot of water scarcity. Societies with a cultural history of confronting water scarcity have found ways to adapt to those conditions. 52 This stability is often hard fought and tenuous. The fact that living with scarcity
becomes, of necessity, a part of the population's cultural identity has the potential
to transform technical changes in supply into a cultural affront. This is apparent
in places like Egypt, which almost totally dependent on the Nile for its water.5 3
Upstream development of the Blue Nile, especially by Ethiopia, has become a
tense diplomatic challenge that the Egyptian government regards as an existential
threat. In other places, an abundant water supply is not enough to prevent migration and conflict. In fact, both unusually high rain intensity and the perception of
unusual seasonal water availability are positively correlated with conflict and
militant activity. But too much rain at the wrong times also has the capacity to
cause food insecurity-linked migration. 5 4 Whether the issue is scarcity or unusual
abundance, the connections between environmental conditions and human behavior depend on understanding the social conditions which make scarcity a
vulnerability.
On the other hand, the more complex analysis of environmental migration
makes it difficult to argue that water migration, or even environmental migration
more broadly, is a special case which deserves unique sorts of legal protection. If
almost any individual putative case has to be understood as irreducibly linked to
49 UNICEF, supra note 21.
50 Jeffrey D. Sachs, supra note 13.
51 Black, supra note 13.
52 Colin H. Kahl, supra note 11.
53 Richard Kyle Paisley, Why the 11 countries that rely on the Nile need to reach a river deal soon,
THE CONVERSATON (Aug. 27, 2017), http://theconversation.com/why-the- 11-countries-that-rely-on-thenile-need-to-reach-a-river-deal-soon-75868.
54 Devlin &. Hendrix, supra note 2.
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some social, demographic, economic, or political conditions, it is unclear what
separates it from other forms of migration. This, I think, may turn out to be a
blessing if properly understood. But before turning to the reasons for this, it is
worth noting one other set of patterns that emerge from the environmental migration literature.
While the drivers of migration are necessarily complex, two main features
seem to tip water insecurity caused by some combination of them into the sort of
social unrest that encourages migration. The first is rapid physical changes in
supply.5 5 These can be caused by natural changes in precipitation-including
56
droughts, floods, and salt water incursion. But rapid supply changes can also
result from human activity-for instance, industrial pollution, infrastructure construction, policy changes, and violence. Rapid changes are more significant than
baseline abundance or scarcity in predicting migration. The second factor is poor
governance.57 The social, political, and economic conditions under which people
live determine whether physical water scarcity is water insecurity. This is apparent when considering the differences in the capacity to recover from drought in
places like South Africa, Afghanistan, and the United States. Successful recovery
from disasters depends on a well-organized response and prepared, resilient, and
adaptable institutions. Rapid physical changes in the environment are less destabilizing when the conditions of good governance are present. Poor governance is
actually likely to weaken the ability of a population to remain resilient during
sharp supply changes, deepening the consequences of acute and sudden
scarcity .58
The main vector for water-specific migration, on this analysis, runs through
sudden-onset disasters and progressive deterioration of water resources that cause
water and food insecurity linkage, especially for water-ecosystem dependent livelihoods in agriculture and fisheries. 59 Whether water resource degradation will
result in migration depends on the "meso level" features of water management,
institutional governance, and whether threatened communities can cooperate and
60
negotiate with better-off neighboring populations. Even if a population does not
move to find new water sources, people, especially men, may travel to new locations to find work. These rates of internal movement rise notably during and after
drought and flood events. 6 1 Among the leading causes of displacement is poor
55 Chellaney, supra note 3; Busby, supra note 3; Troubled Waters: The Effects of Scarcity on Interests, Identities, Conflict and Cooperation,in Trw MULTICULTURAL DILEMMA: MIGRATION, ETHNIC POLITICS, AND STATE INTERMEDIATION (Michelle Hale Williams ed. 2013); WBG, supra note 24.
56 See Devlin and Hendrix, supra note 2 (Interestingly, there is some evidence that it is both weather
variability and perception of weather variability which most directly influence civil unrest.).
57 Wolf, supra note 43; WBG, supra note 24.
58 M. Miletto et al., supra note 13.
59 Black, et al., supra note 13.
60 Id.; Miletto et al., supra note 13.
61 Clark Gray & Valerie Mueller, Drought and PopulationMobility in Rural Ethiopia, 40 WORLD
DEV. 134, 134-145 (2012); Tamer Afifi, Economic or Environmental Migration? The Push Factors in
Niger, 49 INT'L MIGRATION (2011); Sabine Henry et al., The Impact of Rainfall on the First Out-Migration: A Multilevel Event-History Analysis in Burkina Faso, 25 POPULATION & ENV'T 423, 423-460
(2004)
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access to fresh water. 62 Many other common causes of displacement, such as
food insecurity, are substantially related to changes in water availability. The
International Food Policy Research Institute projects substantial declines in rice
and maize productivity by 2050 related to climate change via heat, more
seasonality, frequent extreme storms, drought, and flooding-all of which are
63
water-agriculture interactions.
Finally, it is also worth noting that the negative effects of both water insecurity
and displacement are not uniform even within the migrant population. Women
are especially vulnerable. 64 When water access is poor, they spend a huge
amount of time collecting water, which is physically taxing work that reduces
their ability to be economically productive. This task begins early in life and
disproportionately includes girls, who are prevented from attending school by
water collection duties and because the schools themselves lack adequate sanitation facilities. 65 Water insecurity also has disparate psychological effects. Women register much higher levels of emotional stress and anxiety about water
insecurity and tend to be more water insecure than other members of even the
66
same household.
c.

Mechanisms Governing Water Migration

Water migration, and climate migration more broadly, has elements of both
forced and voluntary migration that make it difficult to subsume under existing
international legal mechanisms. The complexity of the evolving conceptual analysis above has important consequences for the legal treatment of water migrants.
Adequately responding to higher volumes of water security-related migration requires simultaneously acknowledging this complexity while providing something
closer to clear guidance that can inform law and policy at the international level
as populations become more mobile.
In the common analysis, there are roughly three overlapping categories of displacement-those temporarily displaced by sudden-onset disasters, those permanently displaced because of or to avoid major environmental disruptions, and
those displaced by progressive degradation of environmental conditions. 67
Within each of these, but the third most clearly, conditions of social and eco62 Toscano, supra note 13.
63 Gerald C. Nelson et al., FOOD SECURITY, FARMING, AND CLIMATE CHANGE To 2050: SCENARIOS,
RESULTS, POLICY OPTIONS (International Food Policy Research Institute 2010).
64 Maitreyi Bordia Das, THE RISING TIDF.: A NEW LOOK AT WATER AND GENDER (WBG 2017).

65 Jay P. Graham et al., An Analysis of Water Collection Labor Among Women and Children in 24
Sub-Saharan African Countries, PLoS ONE (June 1, 2016).
66 Sera L. Young et al., Household Food Insecurity, MaternalNutritionalStatus, and Infant Feeding
PracticesAmong HIV-lInfected Ugandan Women Receiving Combination Antiretroviral Therapy, 18 MATERNAL AND CHILD HEAITH J. 2044, 2044-2053 (2014); Elijah Bisung & Susan J. Elliott, Psychosocial
impacts of the lack of access to water and sanitation in low-and middle-income countries: a scoping
review, 15 J. OF WATER AND HEALTH 17, 17-30 (2017).
67 Naser, supra note 16; El-Essam Hinnawi, Environmental refugees, in ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES,

(1985); RENAUD ET AL., supra note 38. The fourth category above, displacement by the displaced, has yet
to receive much attention.
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nomic vulnerability complicate the degree to which environmental conditions are
the most direct cause of migration. Labor migration, for instance, may have been
a common strategy to cope with poverty, but a progressively degraded environof the strategy over time resulting in cycles of
ment can reduce the effectiveness
68
migration.
more permanent
The fact that water migration has elements of both force and voluntary adoption is significant for its legal status. Moreover, the causes of migration have both
political and environmental origins. This, as others have noted, makes trouble for
69
the idea of including environmental migrants under the heading of "refugees.
The concept of an "environmental refugee" "naturalizes the economic and political causes of environmental degradation and masks the role of institutional responses to it."' 70 In emphasizing the environment as a cause it seems to
deemphasize the powerful role that governance plays in creating environmental
problems and mitigating their effects. It also suggests that "forced" migration
must stem, more or less directly, from persecution, and that the legally significant
sort of movement is only that which crosses some politically recognized (especially international) border. 7 1 Neither of these accurately describe climate migrants. The status of environmental refugees is not reducible to this definitional
squabble, however. It represents an evolving set of legal considerations where the
question is whether to expand a category (and hence both responsibility and remedy) or to create a new category altogether for a set of circumstances that are
unique enough not to fit within existing frameworks.7 2 The global scale of environmental change, the fact that (while it includes acute disasters) it is persistent
and non-episodic, and the reality that human activities are part of its causal origin
as well as the ability to stop it, all make climate induced migration a special
case. 73 The viability of "environmental refugees" and the sub-group "water refugees" as a group with special rights seems to depend on unraveling several competing narratives about responsibility packed into these concepts. Another way to
put the question here is to ask whether legal responses to climate migration ought
to follow the academic assessment into the wilderness of greater complexity that
an adequate empirical story about the causes of migration requires.
There is currently no broadly accepted international legal definition for either
'environmental migrant" or "environmental refugee." The term "environmental
refugee" first appears in a 1985 UN Environment Program report, which defined
environmental refugees as those "who have been forced to leave their traditional
habitat.. .because of a marked environmental disruption.. .that jeopardized their
68 El-Hinnawi, supra note 67.
69 Rina Kuusipalo, Exiled by Emissions-Climate Change Related Displacement and Migration in
InternationalLaw: Gaps in Global Governance and the Role of the UN Climate Convention, 18 VT. J.
ENV'T L. 614, 614 (2016); Naser, supra note 16; PIGUET, supra note 31.
70 Hartmann, supra note 18.
71 Swain, supra note 42, at 965.
72 1 leave aside another possible view-that we are not describing any real phenomenon and so both
the concept and responsibility can be safely ignored by the law.
73 Warner, et al. supra note 13, at 691-692.
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existences and/or seriously affected the quality of their life."' 74 This definition
sparked several points of disagreement, including disagreements over the terminology ("refugee" or "migrant" or "displaced person"); bright lines for involuntary and voluntary migration as well as environmental and non-environmental
factors; and differential protections for sudden and slow-onset events. 75 Among
these conversations, initial discussions focused on whether affected populations
were likely to eventually return to their homes. 76 This was already a departure
from the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees, which, along with the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, identified four essential features of a refugee in Article l(A)(2)-they must be (1) outside their country of
nationality, (2) unable or unwilling to seek protection from their home country
(3) as a result of a reasonable fear of persecution (4) on the basis of race, religion,
nationality, social membership, or political opinion. 7 7 Whether environmental
migrants are moving voluntarily or are being forced by water insecurity crosscuts this definition, which is manifestly too narrow to address them even if we
acknowledge that at least some of the sources of water insecurity are political.
Crafted with World War H in mind, the definition turns on the key requirement
of persecution, which the international community has agreed environmental migrants do not meet. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook explicitly states that the lack of persecution "rules out such persons as victims of
78
famine or natural disaster."
The 1969 Organization of African Unity/African Union Convention and the
1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees both explicitly extend the relevant
causes of movement in the definition of "refugee" to include people fleeing
"events seriously disturbing public order."' 79 This would seem to allow
disruptions caused by environmental degradation, but neither has been clearly invoked
to address movement for environmental reasons. In the case of the Cartagena
Declaration, it was amended specifically to limit its ability to do S0.80
Beyond refugee status, there are some existing yet limited legal protections
that may assist with climate-induced migration and displacement. For example,
Environmental migrants might attempt to seek protection as internally displaced
74 El-Hinnawi, supra note 67; Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting a Rising Tide: A
Proposalfor a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENv'T. L. RLv. 349, 349 (2009).
75 Biermann & Boas, supra note 34.
76 David Keane, The environmental causes and consequences of migration: a searchfor the meaning
of environmental refugees, 16 GEio. IrNr'i, ENvn,. L. REv. 209, 210 (2003).
77 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees Ch. I Art. I(A), Jul. 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137; United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S.
267.
78 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1,
(Jan. 1992), http://www.unhcr.org/4d93528a9.pdf; Toscano, supra note 12.
79 Org. of African Unity [OAU], Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa art. 1(2), Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45; Colloquium on the Protection of Refugees in Central
America, Mexico, and Panama, Declaraci6n de Cartagena art. 3, Nov. 22, 1984.
80 Keane, supra note 77, at 216.
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persons, governed by the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacements. The
Guiding Principles categorize internally displaced persons as:
"[P]ersons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to
leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in
order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence,
violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not
crossed an internationally recognized State border." 8'
Despite its clear inclusion of environmental migration, the Guiding Principles
are limited in application to displacement within a country rather than migration
from one country to another. Moreover, the Guiding Principles call on states to
take responsible action when managing internal displacement but do not provide
or financial assistance to aid the effort, effectively nullifying
further technical
82
their impact.
Another potential avenue is the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons, which protects people "not considered as a national by any
State under operation of its law."'83 Though it may potentially apply to citizens
been
living on land disappearing due to sea level rise, the Convention has only
84 Simistateless.
are
who
those
to
rights
few
outlines
and
signed by 23 countries
larly, the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the 1986 UN Declaration
on the Human Rights of Individuals who are Not Nationals of the Country of
85
Which They Live do not have either broad ratification or clearly defined rights.
Some of the goals of protecting the water insecure (whatever the cause) may also
be found in declarations of the human right to water.86 The UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights links the right to water with the general
right to adequate standards of living:
"The human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable,
87
physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses."
Meanwhile, the UN General Assembly Resolution states that:
81 U.N. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 1997/39 on its
Fifty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 ( Feb. 11, 1998).
82 Toscano, supra note 12.
83 ESCOR, U.N. Res. 526 A(XVU) (Apr. 26, 1954).
84 Toscano, supra note 12.
85 Id.

86 Peter H. Gleick, The Human Right to Water, 1 WATER POLICY 487, 487 (1998); Peter H. Gleick,
The Human Right to Water, PACIFIC INSTITUTE (2007), http://smtp.wecalc.org/reports/

human ight may07.pdf; S.M. SALMAN & S. MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, WORLD BANK GROUP [WBG], THE
HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: LEGAL AND POLICY DIMENSIONS. LAW, JUSTICE, AND DEVELOPMENT (2004);
STOCKHOLM INT'L WATER INST., THE HUMAN RIGHTS TO WATER AND

SANITATION AND THE HUMAN

RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH (2016); INGA T. WINKL ER, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER (2012); see G.A.

Res. 51/229, (Apr. 11, 1997); see Ariel Litke & Alistair Rieu-Clarke, The UN Watercourses Convention:
A Milestone in the History of International Water Law, GiOBAL WATER F. (2015), http://www.global
waterforum.org/2015/02/02/the-un-watercourses-convention-a-milestone-in-the-history-of-internationalwater-law/.
87 U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The right to water

(arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003).
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"The right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right
that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights; [and] calls
upon States and international organizations to provide financial resources, capacity-building and technology transfer, through international assistance and cooperation, in particular to developing countries, in order to scale up efforts to provide
safe, clean, accessible and affordable drinking water and sanitation for all..."88
The typical goal of human rights in this context is their "progressive realization" through national level laws. 89 Human rights thus impose fairly discrete obligations for, at least, the nation states that are party to the covenant. 90 The
existence and obligatory force of such a right, however, is not believed to be
contingent on the existence of these laws. 9 1 As such state-level laws do not create
the right, they are the mechanism by which states fulfill their obligations to respect and protect them.9 2 One benefit of this approach to extending legal protections to water insecure people is that it makes no explicit reference to borders.
This is valuable because much of what we would identify as water migration is
sub-national and internal, and thus harder to fit under the framework of refugee
protocols.
Given this background, there are no obviously good options for integrating
environmental migrants into existing international legal frameworks. The most
straightforward options are (1) expanding the definition of "refugee," (2) creating
a new legal category of "climate refugee," (3) finding ways to respond to climate
pressures under the existing definition, or (4) denying climate refugees a legal
status. Expanding the definition risks watering down protections for traditional
political refugees. The specificity of the definition in the UN Refugee Convention contributes to its value as a tool for protecting migrating populations because
it runs less risk of outright rejection by states with an interest in preventing that
migration that would be likely to argue that their right to enforce their borders
cannot be open to such broad interpretation. There is fairly steady and increasing
pressure by developed states to limit refugee status, so a further expansion seems
politically unfeasible. 93 Moreover, expanding the international definition of refugee could well be used as cover by national governments accused of causing
displacement to de-politicize the causes of the migration, blaming climate
change, and hence expanding responsibility beyond its borders. Even if these
88 GA Res. 64/292, at 2 (Aug. 3, 2010).
89 The Rt Hon Lady Justice Arden, Water for All? Developing a Human Right to Water in National
and InternationalLaw. 65 INT'l, & COMp. L.Q. 771, 785-86 (2016).
90 See Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulatinga Human right to Water, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q.
957, 957 (2004) (These include obligations to respect the right (by not preventing its realization), to
protect the right (by preventing third parties from preventing its realization), and to fulfill the right or
"facilitate enjoyment of the right [and] promotion of the fight through education measures, and provision
of the right where individuals or groups cannot realize the right due to insufficient personal means.");
Arjun K. Khadka, The Emergence of Water as a 'Human Right' on the World Stage: Challenges and
Opportunities, 26 INT'l J. WATrER RESOURCFS Dizv. 37, 37 (2010).

91 Brunner et al., The Human Right to Water in Law and Implementation, 4 LAws 413, 414 (2015).
92 Malcolm Langford, The United Nations Concept of Water as a Human Right: A New Paradigmfor
Old Problems?, 21 tN-r'L J. WATER RESOURCES Div. 273, 277 (2005).

93 Biermann & Boas, supra note 33.
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in bad faith, they are more or less prevented by the tradiattempts are undertaken
94
definition.
tional
The second option is to create a new category altogether. This would reflect
the reality that climate change, as a vector for migration, has become an intense
enough pressure that it deserves its own legal status. The major obstacle to this at
the moment is the lack of political support for the idea. Getting the international
community to take collective responsibility for anthropogenic harm to the environment has been less than successful, and it seems unlikely that collective responsibility for the consequences of that harm is in the offing. As a conceptual
matter, this is also unattractive because it requires distinguishing the environmental factors and political factors in migration in ways inconsistent with our best
scientific understanding of their deep relationship. This may suggest the third
option, i.e. finding ways to treat individual cases of putative environmental migration as instances of the political persecution definition within the UN Refugee
Convention. This might be done by noting the fact that environmental degradation often has social and political origins. However, it is much harder to establish
that they result from persecution. Worse still, there is no plausible way in which
environmental harms caused by climate change are aimed at specific racial, religious, or political groups. Even if it turns out that, because poverty and climate
vulnerability are related, the effects of climate change are distributed in socially
unfair ways, this is far from showing that responsibility for this harm can be
attributed to anyone in particular. A final option is to simply reject the idea that
climate refugees ought to be given a special legal status at all. This is unattractive
if predictions about the scale of the climate migrant challenge are even remotely
correct. However, given the difficulty of expanding or supplementing international legal mechanisms, it might be best to export responsibility for responding
to environmental migrants to human rights law and the international aid institutions working to limit the effects of climate change on vulnerable populations.
None of these responses stand out as settling the issue, which underscores the
need for more work on the topic.
IH:
a.

Discussion
Water and Rights

The geography of water and the geography of national political boundaries
frequently do not coincide. There are 145 countries that share surface water, 286
international river and lake basins, and 274 shared underground freshwater basins. 95 Thirty-three countries have more than 95% of their territory in a shared
basin. In places where borders disregard the geography of water basins, they tend
to be defined by them directly-such as when a river forms the border between
nations or sub-national territories. When considered alongside the conclusions
above-that water insecurity will increase as a result of climate change and en94 Keane, supra 77, at 218.
95 Transboundary Waters Assessment Programme - RIVER BASINS COMPONENT, http://twaprivers.org/.
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courage human migration, and that there are no satisfactory international protocols for handling this movement-we face some difficult legal and policy
questions about how to proceed. This section discusses the potential conflict between conceptions of rights to water and the authority of a state to prevent
immigration.
It is worth noting that water is somewhat special case of resource depletion.
Water insecurity of the sort that encourages migration typically builds over a
long time, unmitigated by governance, and becomes suddenly pressing through
an acute event, such as a drought. 9 6 The difference between water insecurity migration and displacement by disaster is that migrants are unlikely to return home.
Desertification, which is the extreme version of this, prevents large-scale population return. 97 However, even less permanent conditions can make returning unlikely. The vast majority of water globally is used for agriculture, which in turn
employs a large portion of the world's population. 9 8 Consistent disruption of reliable water resources for farming is a migratory pressure that is difficult to reverse. Second, improving water access is an expensive and technically difficult
project. While a portion of the world's water insecure population are dealing with
increasing physical scarcity of environmental water, many places lack adequate
water infrastructure which would help them make available natural water resources accessible. The expense of building catchment and piped infrastructure
for very poor populations has kept access rates low even in regions with decent
renewable water supplies. 9 9 Third, the uneven distribution of water on the planet
is largely a natural phenomenon for which humans are not responsible. 1° ° While
one might argue that the global distribution of wealth and political power is unjust in various ways and influences a population's ability to make use of the
resources that surround it, no one is responsible for the natural distribution of the
resources themselves. This is significant because, even though global consumptive freshwater use is competitive (i.e. my consumption reduces the immediately
available stock for others), this only really affects people within the same basin.
There are reasons to object to overconsumption in the Great Lakes region, but not
because they directly reduce the stock of resources for people in Nigeria.
Despite these special challenges, there is a broadly accepted sense that people
have something akin to rights claims on water resources. 10 ' This is central to an
96 See Steduto et a]., supra note 27.
97 See generally, Thomas Hammer, Desertificationand Migration:A PoliticalEcology of Environmental Migration in West Africa, in 20 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POPULATION MIGRATION 231 (Martin Beniston ed., 2004).

98 Gleick, supra note 7.
99 World Bank Group [WBG], High and dry: Climate change, water, and the economy 21 (2016),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/water/publication/high-and-dry-climate-change-water-and-theeconomy.
100 It is worth asking whether human activity via global warming has altered water availability in
ways that call the "naturalness" of this distribution in to question, so I will return to this in the next
section. Large scale interbasin transfers are also a potential exception, but they are relatively rare.
101 Inga T. Winkler, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: SIGNIFICANCE, LEGAL STATUS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR WATER ALLOCATION (Reprint edition ed. 2014); Salman M. A. Salman & Siobhan Mcinemey-Lank-

ford, The Human Right to Water: Legal and Policy Dimensions, WORLD BANK, 2004; Benjamin Mason
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adequate response to climate migration across borders, which present a conflict
between rights claims. A state's authority to make decisions about immigration
and to protect its citizens' claims to natural resources within the territory is challenged by apparently more general individual rights claims to water resources
necessary for life. It is a common sentiment that there is a human right to at least
10 2
basic access to freshwater to meet daily needs. The basis for this human right
is largely moral at present, though as noted above, there have been efforts to
provide it with legal status.' 0 3 The basic view holds that there is a right to water
1° 4
Water of sufficient quantity and
because it is constituent to a right to life.
goes, if we have a legally proreasoning
the
quality is necessary for living and,
to things directly necessary
right
tected right to life, we must have a concomitant
for life.
There are several significant problems for this line of reasoning, however. One
is that it seems to establish only that people have a right not to be denied access
to water that they need to live. That is, it does not establish that they have a right
to some quantity of water. If correct, this leaves out a large number of the cases
we care about-in which water access is naturally low, depleted over time, or
caused by natural disasters. Some will argue that human rights are not necessarily
limited to negative rights (of non-interference), but this raises some difficult
questions about what one is entitled to and whose responsibility it is to provide it.
Tying the right to water to the right to survival only secures a right to a very
small amount of water. Basic survival requires only 2-4.5 L/day, but this is far
below the 50-100 L/day that the World Health Organization treats as a basic
minimum.' 0 5 In any event, this misses the spirit of the idea that people have a
basic entitlement to water security which increasingly ties basic entitlements to
°6
broader sets of needs for human wellbeing.l If we assume that the positive
entitlement is quite a bit larger, then the practical challenges of provision loom
large. Responsibility for supplying water when natural and economic resources
are limited cannot practically fall on individual states were water insecurity is a
persistent challenge. The economic and human cost of building water infrastructure is quite high. Consider the large amount of forced displacement that has
happened in China to improve the water distribution and power infrastructure for
Meier et al., Translating the Human Right to Water and Sanitation Into Public Policy Reform, 20 Sci.
AND ENG'G E-rmcs 1, 1-16 (2014); Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulatinga Human Right to
Water, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 957 (2004).

102 Id., see especially Winkler, supra note 101.
103 See generally, Bluemel, supra note 90; Brunner et al., supra note 91; Peter H. Gleick, The Human
Right to Water, 1 WATER PoL'Y 487, 487-503 (1998).
104 John Scanlon, Angela Cassar & Nodmi Nemes, Water as a Human Right? 51 (Int'l Union for
Conservation and Nature Ser. No. 16) (2004); Bluemel, supra note 90; Gleick, supra note 86; Vrinda
Narain, Water as a Fundamental Right: A Perspectivefrom India, 34 VT. L. REV. 917, 917 (2009);
Sharmila L. Murthy, The Human Right (s) to Water and Sanitation: History, Meaning, and the Controversy Over-Privatization,31 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 89, 89 (2013).
105 Peter H. Gleick, Basic Water Requirementsfor Human Activities: Meeting Basic Needs, 21 WATER
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the general population. 10 7 Millions of people have been involuntarily relocated to
build massive interbasin transfer projects from the wet southern parts of the
country to the dry northern ones. The environmental costs of these projects are
significant as well, and thought they solve some water security problems in the
short term, they do so by causing significant externalities in other areas.
Whether explained in terms of the right to life or not, the idea that humans
have a basic ight to water is motivated by the idea that it is individual need
which entitles people to a share of water resources. This is a welfare-based view
of these rights-the claim to a portion of the world's water rests on the fact that
their individual welfare is damaged when they do not get it. An alternative tactic
for establishing a right to water runs through the authority of states to protect
citizens' property rights to resources they need or territory that they occupy. In
fact, some classical theories of state authority tend to argue that states gain their
legitimacy exactly by protecting people's property claims to resources, or by providing a fair playing field of justice and law necessary to make property rights
secure.10 8 One reason to justify a right to water this way is that it puts what looks
like a contest between rights claims-rights to welfare and rights to territory-in
the same terms. Both are explained through the state's authority to protect or
deny people's claims. To a very a great degree, people's prospects for welfare are
dependent on the stability of institutions that define the nation in which they live,
and on contemporary liberal views of state legitimacy, the ability to maintain just
institutions that protect basic rights underwrites a state's jurisdictional authority
over its borders. Water's naturally uneven distribution, the disregard for water
sustainability in the founding of political boundaries, and climatic changes, create
a situation in which these rights claims are severely tested.
b.

Water Rights, Depletion, and Borders

If water rights are justified by individual needs-i.e. people have rights entitlements to adequate water resources in order to achieve basic welfare-then this
suggests either a direct conflict of rights claims or a significant re-ordering of
international attitudes about climate migration. It is hard to imagine that a nation's rights to prevent migration across its borders (or to protect the property and
territory rights claims these borders signify) could be so strong as to justify turning away literally any amount of suffering people. If the property claims to water
internal to the receiving state are themselves based on the welfare benefits that
they give to citizens, then this makes the permissibility of denying migration into
107 Jim Yardley, China - Three Gorges Dam - Impact, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2007), https://
www.nytimes.com/2007/1 1/19/world/asia/19dam.html; Mara Hvistendahl, China's Three Gorges Dam:
An Environmental Catastrophe? Sci. AM (Mar. 25, 2008), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
chinas-three-gorges-dam-disaster/.
108 The former view is generally associated with John Locke, and the latter with Immanuel Kant. JOHN
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND

END OF CrviL GOVERNMFNT (1689); Immanuel Kant, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1886); See also,
Onora O'Neill, Justice and Boundaries, in POLrrICAL RESTRUCTRuJRNG IN EUROPE 74-93 (2003); Cara
Nine, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND TERRIrORY (2012); A. John Simmons, On the TerritorialRights of States, 35

Nors 300, 300-326 (2001); David Miller, TerritorialRights: Concept and Justification, 60 POL. STUD.
252, 252-268 (2012).
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a matter of identifying the amount of migration that will maximize group welfare. Desire to have a border that defines national interests and a national value
for protecting an existing way of life may well factor into the calculation. But in
general, if rights to water rest on human welfare, this recommends a significantly
weaker border regime than currently dominates the world. People living in a
water secure country could not justify preventing the movement of people toward
water security if it collectively improves access to those rights, regardless of
whether their own individual welfare will decrease some (perhaps substantially)
in the process. If climate change is disruptive enough, this account of water rights
would result in fairly radical re-ordering of populations, as nations could not
justify turning away climate migrants until the welfare conditions of the people
living there began to badly deteriorate as a result of the migration. On the most
radical versions, it might even recommend annexation of water scarce places by
water rich places in an effort to achieve higher levels of water security.
If, instead of individual needs satisfaction, we think about rights to water in
terms of property rights claims, then the facts of uneven distribution are still
significant. There are two broad legal doctrines that govern water "ownership."' 1 9 The ripariandoctrine entitles everyone with land adjacent to a water
system a proportional amount of the water available in a system on the condition
that they return water to the system undiminished in quantity or quality. Traditionally, this doctrine governs wet places where there is more water available
than demand. Under the appropriationdoctrine, users gain entitlements to divert,
use, and store quantities of water, usually tied to other property rights such as
land titles. This system has a stronger claim on the mantle of a true legal property
right than the riparian doctrine and tends to apply to places in which demand is
significantly higher than available supply. This simple doctrinal division is belied
by a lot of complexity in practice, but for the purposes of this discussion, the
important thing to note is that both systems are typically accompanied by reasonable use conditions. In the case of the riparian doctrine, this is a central part of
the idea. Since most water uses are consumptive, it is frequently impossible to
return water to the common supply undiminished in quantity or quality. As such,
riparianism simply advises reasonable use and entitlements that are conditional
on sufficient abundance. Appropriation of water resources requires serious justification. It is difficult to see how it could be permissible for someone to sequester
water without threatening the common idea that no individual has inherent exclusive claim to the Earth's valuable natural resources. Traditional arguments for
exclusive property rights to natural resources tend to follow Locke in arguing that
appropriation there is still
these claims are defensible with the proviso that after
"enough, and as good, left in common for others." 110 There is intense, and justified, disagreement about the philosophical viability of the appropriation theory
given that reasonable use conditions like the Lockean Proviso, but in application
to water resources, they are generally interpreted to enjoin against making others
109Douglass Shaw, WATER RESOURCE ECONOMICS AND POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION (2008); Robert
Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L.R. 1873, 1873-1875 (2014).
110 See Susan P. Liebell, The Text and Context of "Enough and as Good": John Locke as the Foundation of an Environmental Liberalism, 43 PoLrry 210, 210-241 (2011).
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drastically worse off or failing to put captured resources to productive use.' 1' If

we are inclined to think of water rights claims in terms of property, then it seems
likely that the strength of those rights (i.e. the state's authority to protect them) is
limited in some way by whether the proviso can be met. Because the planet's
water resources are naturally distributed, it seems reasonable to think that resource depletion that is not directly related to poor management is subject to the
proviso. If this is correct then the property rights to water which water rich states
secure become weaker as there is less water available to people, even if they are
beyond the borders of the state. To the extent that the state's authority to enforce
its borders is dependent on its role as an enforcer of property rights, displaced
people have an opening to claim that they ought to be allowed to use a portion of
the resources previously captured by the state. Because water resources are so
difficult to transport, populations affected by climate-related water insecurity
would have a reasonable claim to be allowed to move toward more secure supplies. This model of water rights also suggests that water migrants ought to have
some broader legal claim to migration on the grounds that they are entitled to a
1 12
fair share of planetary water resources.
A more nationalist territorial view of state authority suggests that people have
a strong interest in forming communities that allow self-determination. 11 3 These
include cultural, religious, and ethnic communities that share common bonds of
history, social norms, and practices. They are not inherently geographically delimited, but geography could be an element of their identity. The purpose of the
state, and the source of its authority, one might argue, come from the need of
these groups to protect their continued existence. This theory of state authority
permits significantly stronger restrictions on migration because at least part of the
purpose of the state is to deflect threats to the groups of "peoples" that occupy its
territory. Climate change and water insecurity are geographic threats and displacement may simply destroy a people that has an identity which is strongly
geographically determined. Take, for example, island peoples whose identity is
linked deeply to their island nation. They are self-determining in their desire to
farm, eat, and construct homes in ways that are only possible given the particular
ecosystem of the island. If the island is overtaken by climate change-linked sea
level rise and they must move, they disappear as a people. In most cases, identity
is less place-based and migration will not destroy the group. In such cases, the
state as a responsibility to permit and facilitate internal migration and to prevent
it from reducing the ability of other peoples within the state to live in self-determining ways. Neighboring states, however, might argue that they have significantly less responsibility to accept climate migrants because they have no
IlI See generally Jim Yardly Supra note 107; Mara Hvistendahl Supra note 107; John Locke supra
note 108; Immanuel Kant supra note 108; Cara Nine supra note 108; A. John Simmons supra note 108;
David Miller supra note 108; Douglass Shaw supra note 109.
112 Mathias Risse, The Human Right to Water and Common Ownership of the Earth, 22 J. Poi. PHIL.
178, 178-203 (2014); Tim Hayward, Global Justice and the Distribution of Natural Resources, 54 POL.
STUD. 349, 349-369 (2006); Nine, supra note 108; Michael Blake & Mathias Risse, Immigration and
Original Ownership of the Earth, 23 NoTwe: DAmfz J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 133, 136-137 (2009).
113 See Miller, supra note 108.
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responsibility to preserve the integrity of peoples from other nations. On the
other hand, they may well be willing to absorb those groups if doing so will not
disrupt their responsibilities to other peoples. Presumably their ability to do this
will be heavily dependent on resource availability.
c.

Responsibility for Water Migrants

There are, unquestionably, more ways to think of water rights than as welfare
needs, property claims, or part of group identity. However, each of these views
suggests state should be inclined to facilitate migration unless it will be very
damaging to the receiving nation or sub-national region. The relevant conception
of water rights nevertheless has a significant impact on the extent of the obligation to receive migrants and the reasons that a nation might prevent migration.
Running through each of these views of water rights, one can feel a broader
question looming about the extent of responsibility nations have for opening borders to water migrants when they are not themselves clearly responsible for the
displaced population's water insecurity. Responsibility for remedying the harms
caused by climate change is likely to become a more robust area of international
legal study in the future. Global attitudes about the causes of climate change have
shifted significantly over the last few decades toward the belief that humans are
extensively responsible for its consequences, and that this responsibility is not
evenly spread across the population. If attempts to slow these consequences are
not robust enough, there will likely be a serious push to assign legal responsibility in increasingly formal ways.
I have referred repeatedly to water's naturally uneven distribution across the
planet. There is reason to think that this, coupled with the fact that people are not
responsible for the conditions of their birth, means that any resulting personal
disadvantage from natural water insecurity is unjust. The next question is who
has a responsibility to remedy this injustice? The nation in which the water insecure person lives surely holds some responsibility for remedy, but not because of
the fact of natural scarcity. Nations may be responsible, on any of the conceptions of water rights above, for not further limiting citizens' access to water resources. But beyond this, their capacity to improve conditions may be quite
limited. The construction of new water infrastructure, interbasin transfers, or the
wholesale relocation of people is very costly, both financially and socially. The
depth of the need for improved water security makes it attractive to look for
views of responsibility which fall on a much broader scope of actors.
If the negative consequences of water insecurity were directly caused by those
of us in water rich places, or if those of us in water rich places were made better
off by water insecurity elsewhere, there may be grounds for compensatory duties.
That is, if the behavior of members of nation A causes water insecurity in nation
B, B may be owed compensation for the consequences of that insecurity. For
example, in river systems which run through multiple nations, it is possible that
upstream groups have a responsibility to refrain from or repair harm caused to
downstream populations for depleted or polluted water. Causal responsibility for
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downstream water insecurity, ceteris paribus, creates a duty to compensate
downstream riparians which might reasonably include accepting migrants.
Some authors have suggested that water rich places have a responsibility to
compensate water poor places simply in virtue of their differential native access
to the resource. 11 4 This seems incorrect. Unlike carbon emissions, global water
consumption creates a much more attenuated relationship to water depletion in
distant places. The industrialized nations that contribute the overwhelming majority of greenhouse gas emissions have a disproportionate responsibility for the
effects of climate change globally and so a larger responsibly for the negative
consequences on the global environment, some subset of which are water related. 1 5 But water consumption habits in water rich places, such as the Great
Lakes region of the United States, do not directly impact the water security conditions of people in far-away naturally dry places like Egypt. The "water footprint" of products that I consume is sometimes cited as evidence that this
reasoning is not correct. 116 The thought is that the water necessary to produce
products (called "virtual water") in dry places is lost to the water scarce place
which might have used it in some other way. There are a few reasons, however,
for thinking that this virtual water trade does not automatically constitute a harm
that ought to be specially compensated. For one thing, the loss of water to production and trade that dry places face is not theft. It is part of a productive economic process that often improves the lives of the people doing the producing.
Secondly, the wet places in the world are still the largest exporters of virtual
water. Exports of water intensive products from water stressed places do exist,
but typically these places are net importers of water from wetter nations.1 1 7
Water pollution caused by manufacturing, however, is absolutely a form of exported water stress. When we purchase products-especially electronics and textiles-from places where pollution standards are low, we contribute to a system
of production that directly reduces available water supplies in the producing nation. In sum then, the nations contributing disproportionately to climate change
have a greater responsibility to remedy its negative consequences on water security-through aid, compensation, and accepting migrants-but they do not generally have a responsibility to reduce their own consumption as a remedy. In fact,
they may have a responsibly to increase consumption through exporting virtual
water in products to dryer places. Whether places that are naturally dry have an
entitlement claim to a portion of the world's resources independent of any facts
about climate change or global consumption patterns remains unclear.

114 Risse, supra note 108.
115 Union of Concerned Scientists, Each Country's Share of C02 Emissions, (Oct. 11. 2018), https://
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IV.

Responses to Global Water Migration

As with climate change, our individual contributions to global water insecurity
are very small. We may have good reason to change our individual behavior to
help reduce collective stress on the environment, but the most effective mechanism for both mitigating climate change and responding to it remains national
governments and international institutions. The wealthy nations contributing the
most greenhouse gasses, even when they are distant from water insecure nations,
can take responsibility by drastically and immediately reducing their emissions,
targeting aid to climate resilience and adaptation for vulnerable populations, and
18 This has someaccepting water refugees if they are themselves water secure.
what different consequences for the world's two largest emitters-China and the
United States-because China faces much higher rates of internal water stress
then the US. 119 This may ultimately excuse it from accepting large numbers of
climate refugees, but not from compensating those harmed by climate change in
other ways. Because the costs of accepting these responsibilities are potentially
very high, it is tempting to look for ways to distinguish between water insecurity
caused by poor governance, climate change, and natural scarcity. However, these
elements of water insecurity are deeply intertwined. We cannot meaningfully distinguish between water migration resulting from physical scarcity, failures of
governance, or climate change, and so must treat them as all of a piece for the
purposes of policy.
It is clear, however, that there ought to be much greater influence on preventing migration. While it can be a successful adaptation strategy, it is evident that it
120
There is a
is one of last resort, pursued only when everything else has failed.
huge need to organize international preparation for sudden-onset disasters which
includes extended support for populations that may not be able to return home for
some time. More effort can be made to build shared predictive models for both
disasters and population vulnerability that could inform relief and preparation
efforts. The reality is that water insecurity assessments can be done with existing
datasets in way that provides a fairly clear picture of migration and medium-term
water risk. 121 Working the expectation of migration and worsening water security
into relief and resilience planning is essential.
118 Kanta Kumari Rigaud et al., WORLD BANK, GROUNDSWELL: PREPARING FOR INTERNAL CLIMATE
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There is also room to create new international legal frameworks. Julia Toscano
proposes the category of environmentally-displaced persons (EDPs) to standardize terminology and classification, possibly to create new or supplemental human
rights obligations. She argues that a separate climate migration agreement is necessary, operating independently of the UNHCR, with its own oversight and capacity agency to assist and relocate EDPs.1 2 2 Creating a parallel organization to
specifically address EDPs avoids the disagreements about refugee status discussed above, and also allows the agency to focus on internal displacement,
which dominates displacement in absolute terms. Given the physical conditions
which precipitate water migration, it is considerably easier to identify and plan
for emerging migration patterns, and this recommends a dedicated and central23
ized institution. 1
It may also be possible to generate new protocols dedicated to water migration
under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the international cornerstone of climate change law.1 24 Working within the established
UNFCCC framework would create a more integrated approach toward international adaptation policy aimed at maximizing the productivity of existing bodies,
rather than creating new ones. Though the UNFCCC currently frames relations
between states rather than state obligations to individuals, it could incorporate
"assistance obligations" into its existing mandates to maintain common but
differentiated responsibility and reduce global emissions. Others have envisioned
frameworks for an expanded UNFCCC system with a multilateral migration assistance fund sponsored by industrialized countries to support climate adaptation
and relief in countries managing large numbers of environmental migrants.
Biermann and Boas propose one such framework, the UNFCCC Protocol on Recognition, Protection, and Resettlement of Climate Refugees.1 2 5 Under the
UNFCCC framework, the protocol would create an executive committee under
the Conference of the Parties to the UN Climate Convention, operating within its
established structure. The protocol process would parallel previous UNFCCC efforts such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
Any set of international legal efforts will need to be supported by much more
robust mechanisms at the individual state and watershed levels. Carey DeGenaro,
citing the "political challenges and long lag-time" of an international convention,
argues for updating national level refugee laws to handle an expanding class of
climate migrants. In the US, DeGenaro offers, this might include expanding the
definition of a stateless person to explicitly include environmental migrants, al122 Toscano, supra note 12; see also Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confrontinga Rising Tide: A
Proposalfor a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HAuv. ENVTL. L. Rev. 349, 359-361 (2009).
123 Toscano, supra note 12, at 620; Biermann & Boas, supra note 34; See also Docherty & Giannini,
supra note 74; Carey DeGenaro, Looking Inward: Domestic Policyfor Climate Change Refugees in the
United States and Beyond, 86 U. CoLo. L. REv. 991, 991-1047 (2015).
124 See generally Rina Kuusipalo, Exiled By Emissions-Climate Change Related Displacement and
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125 Biermann & Boas, supra note 34.

112

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

Volume 16, Issue 1

Water Insecurity and Climate Change

lowing migrants to apply tor permanent legal status. 12 6 Other states should perform similar domestic legal updates. At least some of these ought to be done in
concert with other nations that share the same watershed. "Transboundary management" at the basin level has long been a soft recommendation in the water
conflict literature. Discrete agreements to change domestic immigration laws between riparian nations for the purpose of absorbing and directing resources toward water migrants puts real substance into this recommendation.
VI.

Conclusion

Water insecurity is already a serious and worsening global challenge. There is
strong indication that climate change will deepen water insecurity and result in
larger numbers of displaced people migrating to find more stable water resources.
The traditional linear story which originates in scarcity and ends in migration is,
however, vastly oversimplified. Water insecurity and any resulting water migration is irreducibly tied to the social, economic, and political conditions which
surround natural and climate-induced scarcity. Rejecting the linear account of
migration, however, does not prevent us from identifying important patterns and
factors that contribute to water migration patterns. Rapid physical changes in
supply and weak governance stand out as factors that precipitate migration.
Understanding state obligations toward water migrants depends, I have argued,
on an understanding of why we think people have a right to water, as well as the
ways in which hydro-social factors influence their ability to satisfy this right. The
regimes governing water migration at the international level are deeply inadequate for handling this emerging class of rights conflicts. We are not without
options for expanding and adjusting existing international mechanisms to handle
water migrants. But the scale of the problem and slow movement at the international level indicates that water migration across and within nations will require
rethinking both domestic and international laws. The pace of climate-induced
migration will, sadly, not slow for us to work out responses fully before enacting
them.
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